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Moving Beyond The Crossroads: Strengthening The Atrocity Prevention Board
James P. Finkel
George Washington University
Washington, D.C., USA
My recent essay, Atrocity Prevention At the Crossroads: Assessing the President’s Atrocity Prevention 
Board After Two Years, generated considerable interest among former government colleagues, 
scholars, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that follow issues of atrocity prevention and 
response.1 As the waning months of the second Obama administration tick down and the growing 
field of 2016 Presidential contenders wrestles with how to approach atrocity questions during the 
campaign, some have asked whether Washington’s current approach to atrocity prevention and 
the functioning of the Board (APB) might be improved. Meanwhile, one of the main challenges 
for members of the Atrocity Prevention Board will be to become more visible and to demonstrate 
the utility and effectiveness of their deliberations and tools. The President will need to remind his 
key foreign policy advisors of the seriousness he attaches to these issues. The APB would benefit 
from a further public explanation of how the prevention of atrocities is clearly linked to other key 
US foreign policy goals, including counterterrorism, economic growth and development, reducing 
poverty, and building rule of law, among other dimensions. 
The pages that follow attempt to lay out a number of simple, practical steps that the Board can 
take to enhance its performance and its visibility vis-à-vis the American public and the international 
community. Because the Board functions within a broader decision making context, however, more 
far-reaching change will be necessary for it to meet its full potential.2
The President’s decision to announce the launch in August 2011 of Presidential Study 10 (PSD 
10) aimed at finding more effective ways for the US government to prevent and, failing prevention, 
respond to atrocities beyond our borders at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum was deliberate. 
Indeed, the President went so far in that initial speech as to declare the prevention of genocides 
and mass atrocities a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United 
States, placing these issues for the first time squarely at the center of an administration’s agenda. 
He returned to the Museum some eight months later in April of 2012 to declare that the study 
had been completed, that he had accepted all of its recommendations (PSD 10 included over 
100 recommendations), and that he was instructing his National Security Council to establish 
an Atrocity Prevention Board whose job would be to further flesh out the study’s findings, put 
them into practice, and ensure that Washington’s efforts to prevent genocides and other forms 
of mass atrocity would hereafter have real bite. The Board was to consist of representatives from 
some nine Departments and Agencies at the Assistant Secretary level or above. In short, people 
who theoretically had a broad enough span of control that they could move personnel and other 
resources to potential trouble spots whenever and wherever they might be needed.
Highlights from APB Announcement
The President announced the establishment of the APB in a speech at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum 
on April 23, 2012. According to the White House press release accompanying the speech, the APB was to:
• Include representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland 
Security, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Agency for 
• International Development, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence 
• Agency, and the Office of the Vice President who were:
-- At the Assistant Secretary level or higher
-- Appointed by name by their respective agency heads;
• Be chaired by the NSS Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights;
• Meet at least monthly and additionally as urgent situations arise;
• “Oversee the development and implementation of atrocity prevention and response policy;”
• Submit an annual report on its work to the President and have its work reviewed
-- At least twice a year by the Deputies
-- At least once a year by the Principals.
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After six months of operations, the APB chair was to draft an Executive Order that would “set forth the 
structure, functions, priorities, and objectives of the Board, provide further direction for its work, and 
include further measures for strengthening atrocity prevention and response capabilities as identified in 
the course of the Board’s work.” As of this writing, this last prescription has yet to be fulfilled.11
The tone and content of the President’s speeches, along with the choice of the Museum for 
their venue, raised expectations among human rights groups both at home and abroad at least 
initially that a more muscular US atrocity prevention policy was in the offing. This optimism 
prevailed despite regular admonitions from the Atrocity Prevention Board’s first chairperson, 
then Senior Director for Multilateral and Human Rights Affairs, and current US UN Ambassador 
Samantha Power, that the P in APB shouldn’t be seen as a panacea to the world’s problems.3 At 
the same time, however, the announcement prompted nervousness from some quarters within 
Washington’s foreign policy establishment who were already wrestling with wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, dealing with the impact of financial sequestration, and being buffeted by the 
winds of Arab Spring and quickly deteriorating conditions in Syria. Their concern was that the 
President was opening the door to additional undertakings at a time when the system was already 
overloaded.
Among those who had followed atrocity issues for some time, a sense soon emerged that 
despite having rolled out the APB with considerable fanfare, the President and influential members 
of the White House staff were stepping away from the initiative. Some prominent participants in 
the President’s newly formed APB bristled privately over the White House’s reluctance to further 
discuss the Board or its work publicly, while the President himself seemed to avoid further references 
to the Board or its work. An Executive Order that was supposed to have followed the President’s 
announcement of the Board and the acceptance of PSD 10’s recommendations was quietly shelved 
without explanation. While members of the APB and the APB’s subordinate group, the sub-APB, 
occasionally were told by various senior White House officials in the months that followed that the 
President remained committed to their work and appreciated their efforts, the APB or its counsel 
rarely seemed to factor into communications or instructions emanating from the White House. 
The APB fared little better in other key foreign policy Departments and Agencies. For example, 
one regular participant in the State Department’s senior staff meetings noted that while Secretary 
Clinton had also given an important speech about atrocity prevention at the Holocaust Museum, 
they were unable to recall an instance in which the issue of taking further steps to strengthen 
atrocity prevention within the Department as a whole had been broached during those meetings.
Early members of the APB and sub-APB were themselves divided over how much attention to 
draw to their work in the increasingly toxic domestic political scene that prevailed while the Atrocity 
Prevention Board was beginning its efforts. Generally speaking, those with prior experience in the 
advocacy or NGO world were more open to members of the Board and the sub-APB expounding 
on their work and exchanging views with civil society. Those, on the other hand, who had earned 
their spurs strictly within the confines of the bureaucracy, were more reticent, fearing that outreach 
would both further raise expectations about outcomes and result in an enormous drain on their 
time. Perhaps more importantly, they also feared it would turn what they envisaged as a careful 
deliberative process into another source of incessant partisan wrangling that would make it more 
difficult for the Board to achieve its goals.
Board and sub-APB members were also of several minds about how to begin their work 
program. Although several of the APB’s initial members and those who supported the Board in 
one fashion or another had had a hand in fashioning Presidential Study 10, and had either gone 
into those discussions as veterans of the Genocide Prevention Task Force4 or were at least familiar 
with the Task Force’s recommendations, few anticipated the challenges they would face translating 
the ideas surfaced during the presidential study into practice within Washington’s huge federal 
bureaucracy. For example, what initially were viewed as relatively simple technical fixes to statutes 
and laws aimed at closing loopholes that might allow perpetrators of atrocities to enter the US and 
even obtain residency, led to years of complicated discussion primarily involving State and Justice 
Department, Homeland Security, and Pentagon lawyers.
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Taking their seats at the APB table with at least two years of government experience—and 
many with much more—and having experienced the subtle bureaucratic fisticuffs between regional 
bureaus and their functional counterparts first-hand, most members of the APB initially favored 
a more cautious approach to the Board’s program in hopes that their regional colleagues might 
more easily be brought along. Thus, for both practical and bureaucratic reasons, the Board opted 
first to investigate the mechanisms and means it had available to it and to endeavor to fill any 
gaps with additional tools. The Board and sub-APB devoted considerable time during the Board’s 
initial months to its toolkit. Not everyone agreed that this was the best approach, however. Some 
Board members and members of the sub-APB argued that it was important for the Board to be seen 
pushing more aggressively into controversial cases right out of the gate in order for the Board to 
more firmly establish its bona fides.
Oddly enough, no one with whom I spoke during my research could recall a specific discussion 
during the PSD 10 deliberations about what exactly prevention was to entail. It may be that the 
participants considered the meaning implicit. Many had worked on atrocity issues either inside or 
outside government and felt they had a pretty good idea of what was involved. As one senior State 
Department official observed some months after the Board had begun operating, the Board hoped 
it would bring to Washington’s foreign policy deliberations a willingness and an ability to think 
about atrocity prevention and response across the entire spectrum of conflict: pre-conflict, conflict, 
and post-conflict.
The PSD 10 recommendations were reviewed and endorsed by both the Deputies’ and 
Principals’ Committees (with very minor changes) before being forwarded to the President. 
However, it is not clear how extensive a discussion individual Department and Agency 
representatives who participated in the PSD 10 discussions had with their senior leaders about 
the organizational and material implications that standing up a Board chaired by the NSC and 
tasked with preventing atrocities across the globe would entail. To some extent, this was perhaps 
less an issue for the first generation of Board members, many of whom like those shaping PSD 10 
had either worked on atrocity questions previously, or had strong personal commitment to these 
issues. But atrocity prevention was a new undertaking even for some members of the initial Board 
and they, in particular, depended heavily on their subordinates for advice.
A poll of PSD 10 participants, members of the APB, and sub-APB attendees taken at the time 
the initial Board was standing up probably would have revealed considerable understanding of, 
and support for, the academic theory involving upstream or pre-conflict prevention.5 But many—
especially those with long experience within the bureaucracy—probably would have conceded 
that prevention, if it was going to be pursued at all, would still most likely be limited to crisis and 
post-conflict situations. A policy approach geared toward atrocity prevention, especially upstream 
prevention, would presuppose a significant shift in bureaucratic culture and structure. At the 
Department of State, for example, Foreign Service Officers are still taught that their primary job 
is to observe, analyze, and report, but not to interfere. Yet prevention, at any point along the conflict 
continuum, calls for a much more hands on strategy that includes working with civil society within 
country, other like-minded states, NGOs, international organization and international financial 
institutions to articulate a broad range of possible approaches, programs, and policies tailored to 
fit the specific circumstances in order to avoid, or at least mitigate, the risk of atrocity.
Moreover, as retirements, reassignments, and resignations have prompted rapid turnover 
among members of the Board and the sub-APB, the consensus about when, how, and under what 
circumstances prevention should be pursued has become more frayed. This problem has not been 
limited to a single participating Department or Agency, but has been fairly widespread.
Breaching the Stove Pipes
Stove piping between the State Department’s regional and functional bureaus and within bureaus 
themselves makes it very difficult for even a Regional Assistant Secretary to obtain a complete 
understanding of all of Washington’s policies, programs, and approaches toward a particular 
country at any given moment.6 Finding ways to breach the stove pipes between and within the 
regional and functional bureaus, taking a more internally transparent and holistic approach, ought 
not only to produce more effective policy outputs, but ought to also save taxpayers money over the 
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long run. That may not immediately be clear as the State Department, AID, and others wrestle with 
how to fill the important programmatic gaps that a clearer picture of the sum total of effort toward 
some countries will inevitably reveal. Some additional personnel and money for further assessment 
and programming to fill these gaps will undoubtedly be necessary. These investments likely will 
still be far cheaper than ignoring a situation that risks evolving into a complex humanitarian crisis 
that may require the use of military force further down the road.
A cursory glance across the many warning and watch lists covering various issues prepared by the 
scholarly community and NGO world reveals at least one startling fact: the same twenty or thirty 
countries are frequently found at the top/worst position on many of these lists, albeit in different relative 
positions. Although the particularities of each of these countries’ internal situations will differ, many of 
the underlying structural issues contributing to their appearing on one or another of these topic lists 
will be at least similar. The length of these lists has traditionally caused considerable angst in some 
government quarters with both analysts and policymakers frequently insisting that available time and 
resources preclude so broad a focus. The debate has flared in its most recent iteration even among strong 
supporters of the APB, with those responsible for actually articulating and implementing prevention 
policies generally favoring a narrower, more focused approach while those that believe prevention 
requires a broader rethinking of Washington’s efforts – those that hope to infuse prevention into the State 
Department’s DNA – argue that a narrower focus is a prescription for maintaining the status quo. 
Atrocity events also tend to take place in out of the way places where we and our key Allies 
have our smallest diplomatic presence and where that presence increasingly is focused almost 
exclusively on capitals. Washington desk officers for these countries tend to be more junior and 
less experienced, as are many of their official counterparts in the field. Changing the incentive 
structure, for example, by providing more authority, ensuring that desk officers for those countries 
considered at high risk of atrocities are more experienced and receive the additional training 
mandated in PSD 10, creating flexible, forward-looking country task forces to break through the 
stove pipes, would be an important step at the working level toward enhancing prevention. In 
some situations, it may be that a particular functional issue so predominates Washington’s interest, 
that it makes more sense to give the overall lead of a task force to a functional rather than a regional 
desk officer. That ought not be a problem under this new arrangement as long as that functional 
desk officer has considerable experience and as long as they clearly understand that they have been 
given responsibilities that extend beyond their home unit, and will be evaluated on the basis of that 
broader undertaking’s success or failure.
Attempting To Bridge The Regional/Functional Gap
At the more senior level, the APB will have to continue to work hard to strengthen ties with the 
various regional Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) devoted to particular countries and issues. 
The impetus for establishing an Atrocity Prevention Board, both on the part of the Genocide 
Prevention Task Force and the first Obama Administration, arose from a view that human rights 
issues and atrocity prevention too often had received short shrift from the regional policy bureaus, 
offices, and committees that typically oversee our bilateral relations.
The original idea was that the NSC’s Office of Multilateral and Human Rights Affairs 
(often referred to within the White House simply as Multilat), whose Senior Director chairs the 
Atrocity Prevention Board, would serve as a transmission belt, carrying information, ideas, and 
recommendations back and forth between the APB and the Regional IPC’s. Multilat’s message, it 
was thought, would be reinforced at more senior levels by the fact that some APB members also 
regularly attended meetings of the Deputies’ Committee. But no one at the time anticipated the 
number of atrocity-related issues that the APB would face or the number of related regional IPC 
meetings that Multilat would be required to attend. Multilat, despite its best efforts, soon found 
itself hard pressed to keep up with the constant barrage of regional business, and by some accounts 
sometimes found itself isolated in the face of a regional juggernaut that tended to place greater 
importance on any number of other issues.
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Meanwhile, despite all of the experience and expertise that individual members of the APB 
were able to bring to bear on atrocity problems, they normally were not experts on the nitty gritty 
of the countries being discussed at their monthly APB meetings. Efforts to have NSC regional 
directors brief the APB during those meetings were rarely satisfactory and left at least some APB 
attendees feeling that those parts of the meeting were more akin to a courtesy drive-by intended to 
convince them that they needn’t preoccupy themselves with country x, rather than a real attempt 
at collaboration. Attempts to bring Posts directly into the discussion via secure communications 
generally were more illuminating, but the overall impact of the discussion often turned on the 
quality of the electronic connection and the Chief of Mission’s view as to whether this newly created 
body would prove to be an ally or a problem during their future interactions with Washington.
Steve Pomper, the principal drafter of the PSD 10 report and Multilat’s current Senior Director, 
to his credit, recognized the challenge of managing relations between the APB and the various 
regional IPC’s early on. He has tried, whenever possible, to organize more joint APB/IPC meetings, 
with varying success. The sub-APB has likewise tried to reach out more aggressively to its regional 
counterparts. The truth is that, more often than not, neither the APB nor the regional IPC’s can 
operate at maximum effectiveness without one another’s input. Whoever wins the 2016 Presidential 
election will need to continue to work to improve this part of the system.
Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall 
has devoted considerable attention since coming to office in February 2014 to trying to get the 
State Department’s many voices singing off the same sheet of music on atrocity issues. Sewall 
has instructed the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization (CSO) to serve as something of a department 
secretariat for APB matters, gathering the Department’s views on subjects being deliberated by the 
APB and preparing Department representatives’ briefing books for the APB’s monthly meetings. 
CSO has brought on board some additional people to work on atrocity prevention issues, and after 
a year of work has recently begun to experiment with a new atrocity assessment instrument to 
be used in conjunction with the Department and AID’s broader conflict assessment tool. AID has 
capped a multi-year effort to consider how atrocity prevention meshes with its traditional mission 
by publishing a new Field Guide for Atrocity Prevention. The State Department has also asked 
USIP to develop a new training course for those involved with atrocity issues that will bring some 
of the latest thinking within academia about atrocity prevention to the table. Other groups outside 
government are putting the finishing touches on additional training materials as well. For example, 
the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center is in the final stages of preparing to 
release a new handbook on atrocity prevention. All of these initiatives will reinforce the goals and 
efforts of the APB. To have the desired impact, however, these new materials and course offerings 
will have to be broadly disseminated and socialized among Washington’s foreign policy corps. The 
latter, in particular, will require sustained attention and support from senior leadership, which to 
date, has been sorely lacking.
It may be that as the second Obama Administration winds down and the election season revs 
up, even more responsibility in these areas will fall to members of the sub-APB, who increasingly 
will find themselves called upon to use their personal ties throughout the bureaucracy, rather than 
rank and position, to lead from the middle in order to get things done. The origin of several of the 
APB’s initiatives can already be traced to people associated at one time or another with the sub-
APB, initially made up of some of the people who have worked longest on these issues, who have 
been closer to day-to-day developments in many of the at risk countries than more senior members 
of the APB, and who often have had a better understanding of the various financial accounts and 
what they can and can not be used for. The sub-APB more recently has suffered from some of the 
same problems of turnover as its parent body. It will need to continue to work hard to bring its 
newcomers up to speed and with their support keep the initiatives coming and the momentum 
going. One way the sub-APB might be able to help maintain that momentum would be to work 
with the APB’s chairperson to firmly embed a series of benchmarks into the APB process.
Step By Step
The GPTF devoted considerable space to early warning and argued strongly that the Intelligence 
Community (IC) ought to produce for the White House and what has emerged as the APB, a full-
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blown annual National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) outlining the global risk of atrocities.7 Some 
members of the GPTF appear to have felt strongly that an NIE—which would reflect the formal 
views of the entire Intelligence Community—would not only carry more weight with senior 
policymakers, but would ease the flow of collection resources to atrocity questions by illuminating 
the risks to senior Intelligence leaders through the NIE process. Following the publication of the 
Intelligence Community’s first-ever estimate on the Global Risk of Mass Atrocities—a document 
that drew positive reviews from across government—a senior State Department’s functional 
bureau official echoed the GPTF’s sentiments that having an NIE made it easier for them to urge 
their regional counterparts to take seriously the risk of atrocities in their countries of responsibility. 
The estimate seems unlikely to have had the type of strong impact on collectors that GPTF 
members hoped, however, as most long-term collection priorities generally are decided through a 
separate, formal process. NIEs normally are a substantial undertaking and very few are done on 
an annual basis, although an NIE on the global risk of atrocities every four years would not seem 
unreasonable. While some NIE’s have been completed fairly quickly under special circumstances, 
the average time – in order to allow for all of the required formal meetings and steps—is about nine 
months. The NIE’s utility in helping agencies to prioritize their efforts in real time is thus limited. 
Clearly some sort of annual assessment from the IC needs to be central to the APB process. 
In fact, the IC has a number of assessment art forms available that are similar to an NIE. They 
normally are not coordinated as broadly, nor at as senior a level, and they lack the panache of an 
NIE. However, they undergo rigorous review and are simpler to produce annually. Indeed, as PSD 
10 participants were completing the draft of their report in November 2011, members of the IC 
were already at work on a broad assessment of the global risk of atrocities that was being prepared 
in anticipation of an initial meeting of the APB.8 That all-source assessment was drawn from a 
combination of quantitative modeling, structured expert and post surveys, an intense review of 
published NGO reports, and a close read of other government reporting and analysis. While some 
might view the final product as failing to carry the weight of an NIE, in substantive terms there 
would seem no particular reason why this type of assessment could not substitute for a formal NIE 
during most years.
This ought especially to be the case if the IC continues its initial practice of providing the 
Board detailed monthly updates on each country that appeared in its annual assessment along 
with a context assessment of a country singled out each month by the Board for deeper study. The 
format of the IC’s monthly briefing packages was flexible enough that it allowed the Intelligence 
Community to bring to the Board’s attention situations that might not have factored into its annual 
assessment, but were subsequently showing worrisome signs.
One question the Board will need to decide, and the sub-APB could usefully tee up, is when 
during the year the Board would like to receive the IC’s annual atrocity risk assessment, which 
presumably ought to signal the start of the Board’s work program for the next twelve months. 
Three options immediately come to mind: the beginning of the fiscal year, the beginning of the 
calendar year, and late spring. Using the beginning of the fiscal year would put the APB on the 
same calendar as many other government undertakings. Early January would have the advantage 
of coming right after the holidays when senior policymakers traditionally find some down time 
to ponder the last six months and consider what might lie ahead. Early spring, on the other hand, 
is when some of the data sets the IC draws on are refreshed. It is also the time of year when 
Departments and Agencies are beginning to update their budgets and plans for the upcoming 
fiscal year, and refining their out-year plans. Many policymakers also try to set time aside to assess 
where issues stand and where they hope to direct things through the end of the fiscal year. Working 
backwards from whatever date is chosen, the IC would begin its part of the process by sending a 
structured atrocity prevention questionnaire to posts world-wide and the appropriate government 
analysts in order to begin generating one of several important inputs to its analysis.
Organize Annual Off-site 
Under the best of circumstances, completion of the annual IC atrocity risk assessment would be 
followed soon after by an annual off-site bringing together, at a minimum, members of the APB 
and sub-APB, Regional Assistant Secretaries, and senior NSC regional directors.9 The centerpiece of 
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that meeting would be a presentation by the IC of that assessment followed by a broad discussion 
amongst the assembled policymakers of the report’s implications. The meeting would also provide 
attendees an opportunity to compare the IC’s atrocity risk list with other governmental and non-
governmental lists focused on such issues as political instability/fragility, terrorism, corruption, 
human rights, proliferation, complex humanitarian emergencies, drugs, human trafficking, etc. 
The goal of the meeting would be not only to try to help narrow the gap between the functionalists 
and regionalists on a range of atrocity prevention related issues, but also to begin breaking down 
the stove pipes at a senior level and focusing on common structural drivers and potential policy 
responses.
The meeting would also offer an opportunity on an annual basis to revisit the question more 
holistically at a fairly senior level of what prevention is supposed to mean and what recent experience 
is telling us about what works and what doesn’t.10 It would likewise allow for a discussion of what 
type of atrocity prevention (or combination of prevention) – pre-conflict, conflict, or post-conflict – 
might be most appropriate for each country that the IC has highlighted. Finally, the meeting might 
also allow Departments and Agencies to bring to the table additional country information that had 
not previously been shared outside the stovepipes, or that might otherwise be overlooked. This 
includes materials like AID’s excellent Country Development Cooperation Strategies that tend to 
include a wide range of information relevant to atrocity prevention.
Alert Country Missions 
CSO, as the State Department’s recently designated secretariat for atrocity prevention matters, 
would seem the logical candidate to plan and organize the off-site. CSO would also have 
responsibility for keeping the meeting’s minutes, from which a special reporting message would 
be prepared for those diplomatic missions in the top twenty or more countries that appear on the 
IC’s atrocity risk list. That message would formally alert the Chief of Mission that his country 
was on the IC’s list, explain the reasons behind its inclusion, and summarize the discussion about 
their country that had taken place. It would also instruct the Chief of Mission to designate a senior 
coordinator for atrocity prevention, who depending on the size and make up of the Mission might 
be the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Political Counselor, or the Senior AID Administrator. Copies 
of those messages would also be transmitted simultaneously through military and intelligence 
channels to appropriate Regional Combatant Commanders, Senior Defense Attaches, Chiefs of 
Station, and Treasury representatives and would put them on record that they are to provide 
appropriate support to the Mission’s prevention efforts.
Initiate Horizontal and Vertical Dialogue
The designation of an atrocity prevention coordinator at each relevant Mission should set in motion 
two related dialogues, one within the Mission country team that would consider the feedback 
from the annual Washington off-site, organize a preliminary Mission assessment by the country 
team, review the Mission’s existing programs that contribute to atrocity prevention, and begin the 
process of identifying key gaps. The second dialogue would be between the Mission country team, 
the APB, and the appropriate regional IPC.
Carry Out Conflict/Atrocity Assessment 
As part of that latter discussion, the APB/IPC/Mission country team would jointly agree to organize 
and schedule a multi-agency, multidisciplinary conflict and atrocity assessment with CSO and 
AID as co-leads. Although AID and CSO have done pioneering work aimed at adopting conflict/
atrocity assessments within the US government, their methods have still to gain broad acceptance. 
Good conflict/atrocity assessments cover a broad range of topics and are labor intensive. All too 
often Chiefs of Mission who are less familiar with the practice and wary of having Washington play 
in their sandbox—especially if the outcome could be a report that conveys bad news, or at least 
a storyline that deviates from the picture that the Mission heretofore has been conveying—have 
been reluctant to host these groups. Arguments frequently have ranged from hosting up to a dozen 
team members for a few weeks would overwhelm the Mission’s resources to concerns that their 
presence would quickly become known and would raise the hackles of the host government.
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Past members of the APB have marveled at some of the obstacles that have been raised by 
Missions and home bureaus following proposals from the APB that they host a conflict/atrocity 
study team. From the APB’s perspective, it was offering an opportunity to bring additional resources 
to bear on what were often small, out of the way Missions that under sequestration likely found 
themselves even more resource strained than usual. The APB saw the studies as an initial step to 
try to get ahead of problems and to gain better understanding of conflict and potential atrocity at 
the local level. A given conflict/atrocity assessment rarely, if ever, provides the last word. Instead it 
renders a snapshot of where things stand at a given moment. The scholarly literature suggests that 
they can be most effective as part of an ongoing process. In those instances where Chiefs of Mission 
have been open to hosting these study teams, even on a one-time basis, the results according to 
most accounts, have been very positive. For Washington, when Missions have been on board, the 
challenge has been to find the appropriate personnel and funds to respond to the demand. One 
advantage of widening participation of the annual off-site as suggested above is that bringing the 
regional IPC’s into the discussion at that stage ought to help reassure at least some skeptical Chiefs 
of Mission, especially if the meeting achieves buy in and holds the promise of easing the future 
flow of resources to Missions. It should also serve to free up positions and money necessary to 
meet the anticipated demand for additional studies.
Seek Out Like-Minded Allies 
Similar dialogues will also need to be initiated or strengthened where they already exist with like-
minded partners in Mission states, in Washington, and in other capitals. Seeking the views of civil 
society, the NGO community, other bilateral missions, key international organizations like the 
UN, and international financial institutions, especially locally, will be key to better understanding 
individual situations within countries and orchestrating more effective initiatives while avoiding 
harm. Regular sharing of information and coordination of different programs locally have proved 
invaluable in a variety of situations. But US policy would also benefit from a more regular, structured 
discussion about the risk of atrocities with a variety of like-minded partners in Washington, with 
UN offices in New York, including the office of the Special Advisors on Genocide and R2P, DPKO, 
and the Peace Building Commission, among others, and appropriate offices within the EU, OSCE, 
OAS, ASEAN and the AU, including the latter’s subordinate regional organizations. Each of these 
elements has had their own experiences wrestling with prevention and both they and Washington 
could benefit from a regular exchange of views encompassing both theory and practice.
One means of helping to facilitate those interactions might be to reinstitute and expand the 
Annual Genocide Prevention Conference that Washington hosted for five consecutive years until 
funds dried up. Organized at the working level, these meetings brought together representatives 
from some fourteen governments, civil society, and leading members of the scholarly community 
for frank, unclassified, off-the-record discussions of methodologies for determining risk, evolving 
norms, links between prevention and development and a variety of other related topics. While 
most of the sessions were open to all participants, the meetings were also arranged to allow time 
for some restricted multilateral discussions of more sensitive issues. 
On a more day-to-day basis, it will be up to the APB’s chairperson, working in conjunction 
primarily with the Department of State, to decide at the end of each monthly APB meeting which 
partners might be usefully engaged, whether Washington or a specific bilateral Mission is best 
suited to do it, ensure that it is included in the list of tasks assigned after each meeting, and then 
check systematically to ensure that the contacts actually take place.
Country Task Forces
As the country conflict/atrocity assessments are completed, the APB should task the Department of 
State to establish a series of intra-Departmental, inter-Agency, country-specific, multi-disciplinary 
atrocity prevention task forces to consider the assessments’ findings, take into account information 
that has been gleaned from other partners and any additional studies that might be commissioned 
and, in conjunction with the Mission Country Team, make specific policy recommendations to the 
APB and the appropriate regional IPC. (To maximize efficiency, the Task Forces would also share 
the information they have gathered and their recommendations with the Regional Commands’ 
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contingency planning cells and other appropriate government planning bodies.) Assuming those 
recommendations are approved by the APB and regional IPC, and any higher approvals that might 
be necessary are obtained, it would then be left to the appropriate parts of the Washington foreign 
policy community and, especially, the Mission Country Team to see them implemented, with the 
task forces continuing to monitor progress on a regular basis and to undertake additional formal 
assessments at agreed intervals.
 
Looking Ahead
The path to preventing atrocities in the future is likely to lie less in big theoretical breakthroughs 
and more in the direction of better coordination and integration of policy approaches, both within 
our own government and with key like-minded partners. The remaining months of the second 
Obama Administration will, it is hoped, see the APB and its regional counterparts double-down on 
their efforts to narrow the chasm that continues to divide functionalists from regionalists, identify 
additional resources that can be made available as the economy improves, and identify a variety of 
common drivers and ways to possibly mitigate them.
By the end of the second Clinton Administration those who were associated with the 
Interagency Atrocity Prevention Working Group that Ambassador Dave Scheffer – Washington’s 
first Ambassador-at Large For War Crimes – had organized felt that their group an 
d the approaches they were developing were on the verge of having a strong impact on policy. 
Regrettably, the Scheffer group and the infrastructure it was beginning to create were swept away 
by a combination of political vitriol and different philosophies about how government Departments 
and Agencies should be organized. It was eight long years before the first Obama Administration 
would seriously revisit the approach that Scheffer had pioneered and establish a much more 
sophisticated model with the APB, valuable time wasted in the minds of those who longed to enter 
the fray. Hopefully, whatever Administration eventually succeeds Obama II will seek to learn from 
and build on the Atrocity Prevention Board experience rather than simply cast it aside.
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